Publications
"Arms for Influence? The Limits of Great Power Leverage" European Journal of International Security, 2023. Open access link.
Scholars and policymakers agree that major powers have leverage over their more junior partners. Giving security assistance or providing arms is supposed to increase this leverage. However, major powers often hit roadblocks when trying to influence the behaviour of their junior partners. This article demonstrates that junior partners are often successful in constraining the behaviour of the major power partners, and have particular success in extracting additional resources from their major partners. This article develops the concept of loyalty coercion to explain that leverage is based on rhetorical and symbolic moves, rather than material preponderance. It then uses cases of US arms sales to show that weapons transfers did not lead to US leverage, instead opened opportunities for junior partner influence. The article contributes to scholarly and policy perspectives on alliance management and reputation, and leverage in world politics.
"The Unintended Consequences of Arms Embargoes," Foreign Policy Analysis, 2022, with Raymond Kuo. Link to online advance.
To what extent do arms embargoes curtail the embargoed state’s ability to get conventional weapons? We argue that arms embargoes rarely prevent states from receiving conventional weapons, and are one of the few events that push states to switch their supplier base. Using a new dataset on the place of origin of conventional weapons, we provide a more full and complete picture of the effects of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations and European Union. We show that middlemen, a previously obscured category of states who sell, but do not produce arms, are crucial to skirting embargoes. This article suggests that arms embargoes are a more complicated foreign policy tool than scholars have previously appreciated, and that policymakers need to be cautious in imposing them
"Public Attitudes Toward Diversity, Promotion, and Leadership in the US Military," Armed Forces & Society, 2022, with Robert Ralston. Link to online advance
This article explores how the public understands military service and diversity. Using a conjoint survey experiment, we ask respondents to select between two candidates for promotion. We randomly present respondents’ two profiles, which vary the candidates’ gender, race, sexual orientation, marital status, number of years served, number of deployments, combat experience, and branch of the military. We find that respondents do not discount candidates based on their branch of service, gender, race, or marital status. However, respondents do weigh the candidates’ combat experience, number of years served, and number of deployments favorably. Finally, respondents penalize candidates based on their sexual orientation: Homosexual individuals are less likely to be selected for promotion. Furthermore, respondents especially discounted transgender individuals for promotion. Important differences, we show in this article, also exist between conservative and liberal respondents, as well as between male and female respondents.
"A Call to Arms on Climate Change? How military service member concern about climate change can inform effective climate communication," Environmental Communication, 2021, with Matt Motta and Robert Ralston. Link
US military officials are concerned about the effects that climate change may have on national security. Few, however, have asked military service members what they think about climate change. Fewer still leverage the fact that, as a widely respected group, military concern could help combat public apathy about climate change. We anticipate that communicating the impact of climate change on the military should increase support for climate policy action amongst ideological conservatives; a group that is both skeptical of climate change and deferential to the military. Analyzing data from six surveys, we show that recent service members (1) believe in anthropogenic climate change, (2) are concerned about its effects on national security, and (3) support climate change mitigation policies. Critically, in a novel survey experiment, we demonstrate that conservatives are indeed more likely to express concern about climate change when climate change is framed as a military concern.
"When OK is NOT OK: Public Concern About White Nationalism in the U.S. Military (Research Note)." Armed Forces & Society, 2020, with Matt Motta and Robert Ralston. Link
Are Americans aware and concerned about White nationalism in the U.S. Military? Our large and demographically representative survey suggests that while most Americans suspect at least some presence of White nationalism in the military, many do not view it as a serious problem; particularly self-identified conservatives and respondents who hold highly favorable views toward military service members. However, in a between-/within-subjects experiment embedded in our survey, we show that providing information about the issue of White nationalism in the U.S. Military increases the public’s overall concern about White nationalism in the U.S. Military.
"Taking Social Cohesion to Task: Perceptions of Transgender Military Inclusion and Concepts of Cohesion." Journal of Global Security Studies, 2019, with Robert Ralston. Link
Abstract: Recent political debates over the inclusion of transgender service members in the US military center around the impact such inclusion will have on unit cohesion and effectiveness. Missing from the debate, however, are the perceptions of those who do the soldiering. What are their perceptions of cohesion? Do they, like political leaders and the general public, believe unit cohesion leads to military effectiveness? In other words, how much does the narrative at the elite level—that insists excluding minority groups is a military necessity—match the perceptions of those who serve? Drawing on an original survey of 151 current and former members of the US military, our results suggest that service members’ perceptions mirror those in the general public: political ideology is correlated with beliefs that minority groups disrupt unit cohesion. We find that conservatives are more likely to believe that the inclusion of transgender soldiers will negatively impact cohesion and undermine unit effectiveness. Moreover, conservatives are more likely to endorse a conceptualization of cohesion that hinges on the social—“people like me” or “band of brothers”—dynamics of cohesion rather than more professional, task-oriented conceptions of cohesion. However, military experience affects these perceptions: respondents with combat experience, who held/hold a higher rank, and who are currently serving are more likely to endorse a task-based conception of cohesion that ties cohesion to professionalism and competence, rather than social identity.
"Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention." Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018): 575-606, with Ron Krebs. Link
Abstract: Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.
Scholars and policymakers agree that major powers have leverage over their more junior partners. Giving security assistance or providing arms is supposed to increase this leverage. However, major powers often hit roadblocks when trying to influence the behaviour of their junior partners. This article demonstrates that junior partners are often successful in constraining the behaviour of the major power partners, and have particular success in extracting additional resources from their major partners. This article develops the concept of loyalty coercion to explain that leverage is based on rhetorical and symbolic moves, rather than material preponderance. It then uses cases of US arms sales to show that weapons transfers did not lead to US leverage, instead opened opportunities for junior partner influence. The article contributes to scholarly and policy perspectives on alliance management and reputation, and leverage in world politics.
"The Unintended Consequences of Arms Embargoes," Foreign Policy Analysis, 2022, with Raymond Kuo. Link to online advance.
To what extent do arms embargoes curtail the embargoed state’s ability to get conventional weapons? We argue that arms embargoes rarely prevent states from receiving conventional weapons, and are one of the few events that push states to switch their supplier base. Using a new dataset on the place of origin of conventional weapons, we provide a more full and complete picture of the effects of arms embargoes imposed by the United Nations and European Union. We show that middlemen, a previously obscured category of states who sell, but do not produce arms, are crucial to skirting embargoes. This article suggests that arms embargoes are a more complicated foreign policy tool than scholars have previously appreciated, and that policymakers need to be cautious in imposing them
"Public Attitudes Toward Diversity, Promotion, and Leadership in the US Military," Armed Forces & Society, 2022, with Robert Ralston. Link to online advance
This article explores how the public understands military service and diversity. Using a conjoint survey experiment, we ask respondents to select between two candidates for promotion. We randomly present respondents’ two profiles, which vary the candidates’ gender, race, sexual orientation, marital status, number of years served, number of deployments, combat experience, and branch of the military. We find that respondents do not discount candidates based on their branch of service, gender, race, or marital status. However, respondents do weigh the candidates’ combat experience, number of years served, and number of deployments favorably. Finally, respondents penalize candidates based on their sexual orientation: Homosexual individuals are less likely to be selected for promotion. Furthermore, respondents especially discounted transgender individuals for promotion. Important differences, we show in this article, also exist between conservative and liberal respondents, as well as between male and female respondents.
"A Call to Arms on Climate Change? How military service member concern about climate change can inform effective climate communication," Environmental Communication, 2021, with Matt Motta and Robert Ralston. Link
US military officials are concerned about the effects that climate change may have on national security. Few, however, have asked military service members what they think about climate change. Fewer still leverage the fact that, as a widely respected group, military concern could help combat public apathy about climate change. We anticipate that communicating the impact of climate change on the military should increase support for climate policy action amongst ideological conservatives; a group that is both skeptical of climate change and deferential to the military. Analyzing data from six surveys, we show that recent service members (1) believe in anthropogenic climate change, (2) are concerned about its effects on national security, and (3) support climate change mitigation policies. Critically, in a novel survey experiment, we demonstrate that conservatives are indeed more likely to express concern about climate change when climate change is framed as a military concern.
"When OK is NOT OK: Public Concern About White Nationalism in the U.S. Military (Research Note)." Armed Forces & Society, 2020, with Matt Motta and Robert Ralston. Link
Are Americans aware and concerned about White nationalism in the U.S. Military? Our large and demographically representative survey suggests that while most Americans suspect at least some presence of White nationalism in the military, many do not view it as a serious problem; particularly self-identified conservatives and respondents who hold highly favorable views toward military service members. However, in a between-/within-subjects experiment embedded in our survey, we show that providing information about the issue of White nationalism in the U.S. Military increases the public’s overall concern about White nationalism in the U.S. Military.
"Taking Social Cohesion to Task: Perceptions of Transgender Military Inclusion and Concepts of Cohesion." Journal of Global Security Studies, 2019, with Robert Ralston. Link
Abstract: Recent political debates over the inclusion of transgender service members in the US military center around the impact such inclusion will have on unit cohesion and effectiveness. Missing from the debate, however, are the perceptions of those who do the soldiering. What are their perceptions of cohesion? Do they, like political leaders and the general public, believe unit cohesion leads to military effectiveness? In other words, how much does the narrative at the elite level—that insists excluding minority groups is a military necessity—match the perceptions of those who serve? Drawing on an original survey of 151 current and former members of the US military, our results suggest that service members’ perceptions mirror those in the general public: political ideology is correlated with beliefs that minority groups disrupt unit cohesion. We find that conservatives are more likely to believe that the inclusion of transgender soldiers will negatively impact cohesion and undermine unit effectiveness. Moreover, conservatives are more likely to endorse a conceptualization of cohesion that hinges on the social—“people like me” or “band of brothers”—dynamics of cohesion rather than more professional, task-oriented conceptions of cohesion. However, military experience affects these perceptions: respondents with combat experience, who held/hold a higher rank, and who are currently serving are more likely to endorse a task-based conception of cohesion that ties cohesion to professionalism and competence, rather than social identity.
"Divided Priorities: Why and When Allies Differ Over Military Intervention." Security Studies 27, no. 4 (2018): 575-606, with Ron Krebs. Link
Abstract: Scholars have vigorously debated whether adversaries carefully scrutinize if states have, in the past, demonstrated toughness and whether adversaries base present and future crisis-bargaining behavior on this record. If they do—as a central strain of deterrence theory, and its contemporary defenders, maintain—hard-line policies, including limited military interventions, can bolster deterrence. We know much less about a second audience that is presumably attentive to demonstrations of resolve: allies. A common view, derived from the same logic, and which we call Hawkish Reassurance Theory, suggests that states should support and find reassuring their allies’ faraway military interventions. In contrast, we argue that such interventions call into doubt the intervener’s will and capacity to fulfill its core alliance commitments, undermine the credibility of the alliance, and threaten allies’ security in both the short and long run. Allies thus ultimately oppose powerful partners’ hawkish postures in distant conflicts, and they may even consequently explore routes to security beyond the alliance. To assess this argument, we examine the varied stances leading US allies took from the start of the US intervention in Vietnam through its end. Allied behavior was largely consistent with our expectations. We conclude that, if one reason to deploy force is to signal to allies that you will come to their aid when they call, states should not bother.